The Cost of Clashing with Beijing

Michael D. Swaine Op-Ed May 3, 2012 National Interest

Summary

The more Washington appears to intervene in highly sensitive Chinese human rights disputes, the less likely it is that China’s incoming leaders will make desired changes.

Add a comment

The escape from house arrest, flight to the U.S. embassy and subsequent departure to a Beijing hospital of well-known blind human-rights activist and self-taught lawyer Chen Guangcheng is the latest in a series of incidents that could severely damage Obama administration efforts to reduce growing friction with Beijing. The incident distracts leaders from a spate of urgent bilateral, regional and global problems. Moreover, such occurrences will almost certainly set back the state of human rights in China.

The Chen incident comes on the heels of the ongoing crisis within senior Chinese leadership triggered by February’s flight to (and then retreat from) the U.S. consulate in Chengdu of Wang Lijun, a top associate of the once up-and-coming but now disgraced Bo Xilai. Hence, it suggests a trend toward using offices of U.S. representatives in China as a safe haven for fleeing Chinese notables of all stripes. This suggests that, despite its tarnished international reputation on torture and immigration, the U.S. government is still viewed by Chinese dissidents and communist-party operatives alike as a preferred protector when compared to their own police authorities. But this should not become an established precedent, especially given that Chen is apparently in the process of embarrassing the administration and worsening the crisis by reneging on his earlier insistence on remaining in China—a key element of the deal struck with Beijing to facilitate his departure from the U.S. embassy.

Swaine is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies.

Michael Swaine

Senior Associate
Asia Program

More from this author...

More importantly, these incidents on balance serve more to undermine than benefit U.S. national interests in Washington’s increasingly complex and challenging relationship with Beijing. Occurring on the verge of a major annual Sino-U.S. meeting in Beijing and within months of a historic Chinese Communist Party Congress—the first to witness a large-scale leadership turnover in the absence of the stabilizing influence of past party chiefs such as Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong—these events threaten to draw the United States into China’s domestic leadership disputes and provide leverage to Chinese critics of the bilateral relationship. They also distract both sides from increasingly urgent problems—including maritime security in the Western Pacific, cyber security issues and crises in North Korea and Iran—without improving human-rights conditions in China.

To the contrary, Chinese hard-liners will probably use U.S. involvement in the Wang and Chen cases to push back against supporters of domestic liberalization and closer cooperation with Washington, employing the oft-used tactic of citing foreign interference in and manipulation of China’s domestic problems as part of an attempt to undermine the Chinese regime. And their arguments about American perfidy may be bolstered by recent White House actions on Taiwan.

In an effort to lift a congressional hold on the appointment of a key Defense Department official, the White House director of legislative affairs recently submitted a letter to Congress that seemingly signaled an intent to sell a significant number of advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan. This seems to reverse the administration’s position that the 2011 decision to upgrade Taiwan’s existing fighters, in the words of the Defense Department, “meets Taiwan’s current defense needs.” Such an apparent reversal reinforces the image in China of an unpredictable, troublemaking Washington. Moreover, this apparent gaffe, along with the possibly poorly coordinated (within Washington) admittance of Chen Guangcheng to the Beijing embassy, suggests an absence of central control over U.S. China policy.

Taken together, these developments may place Chinese supporters of a more cooperative U.S.-China relationship on the defensive and almost certainly lead to increased domestic repression. In particular, apparent successors to leadership Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang may now be under greater pressure to affirm the solidarity and rectitude of the Chinese party leadership in the face of such internal criticism and external “threats.” This will in turn diminish support for more decisive moves toward greater openness and reform.

Human rights are an important aspect of U.S. policy toward China. But they are not likely to be advanced via high-profile encounters with Beijing, whether over dissidents such as Chen Guangcheng or efforts to assist losers in internal political fights such as Wang Lijun. The more Washington appears to intervene in highly sensitive Chinese political and human-rights disputes, the less likely it is that we will see the kinds of positive changes in China that many have hoped would emerge from the new central leadership.

This article was originally published in National Interest.

Comments

Comment Policy

Report Abuse

Source: http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/03/cost-of-clashing-with-beijing/aoct

More from The Global Think Tank

BBC News

Chen Guangcheng: Both Countries Want 'Quick Resolution'

Summary Both the United States and China want to resolve the tension caused by the escape of Chen Guangcheng before high-level U.S. officials are scheduled to arrive in Beijing. More >

Bloomberg

Don’t Blame China’s Currency for U.S. Trade Deficit

Summary China's trade surplus has less to do with the value of its currency than it does with rapid urbanization and the rise of production networks across East Asia. More >

China's Rise: Opportunity or Threat for East Asia?

Summary China's rise has had very different consequences for its North Asian and Southeast Asian neighbors, in particular, making it difficult for Southeast Asia to break out of the middle income trap. More >

China Leadership Monitor

China's Assertive Behavior—Part Four: The Role of the Military in Foreign Crises

Summary Although the People's Liberation Army exerts relatively little influence over Chinese decision-making, it plays a somewhat larger role during crises, when senior leaders often rely on the military for intelligence and implementation. More >

March 28, 2012 Beijing

Upcoming S&ED to be First Formal U.S.-China Dialogue Since “Pivot to Asia”

Summary The Strategic and Economic Dialogue, scheduled to be held in May 2012, will mark the first formal U.S.-China bilateral dialogue since the United States announced its strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific region last year. More >

March 12, 2012 Washington, D.C.

China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society

Summary While China is forecast to become the largest economy by 2030, the country faces many challenges in its transition to a high-income society. More >

March 9, 2012 Beijing

U.S.-China Financial Opportunities and Challenges

Summary Since the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the 1970s, trade between the United States and China has ballooned to over $400 billion dollars. While trade forms the bedrock of bilateral relations, significant hurdles still need to be resolved in order to further economic cooperation. More >

In Fact

70%

of oil consumed in the United States

is for the transportation sector.

20%

of Chechnya’s pre-1994 population

has fled to different parts of the world.

58%

of oil consumed in China

was from foreign sources in 2012.

million cases pending

in India’s judicial system.

million people killed

in Cold War conflicts.

18%

of the U.S. economy

is consumed by healthcare.

$536

billion in goods and services

traded between the United States and China in 2012.

$100

billion in foreign investment and oil revenue

have been lost by Iran because of its nuclear program.

4700%

increase in China’s GDP per capita

between 1972 and today.

$11

billion have been spent

to complete the Bushehr nuclear reactor in Iran.

of Iran’s electricity needs

is all the Bushehr nuclear reactor provides.

new airports

are set to be built in China by 2015.

journalists

were imprisoned in Turkey as of August 2012 according to the OSCE.

67%

of the world's population

will reside in cities by 2050.

million Russian citizens

are considered “ethnic Muslims.”

Stay in the Know

Enter your email address in the field below to receive the latest Carnegie analysis in your inbox!

Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

No. 1 East Zhongguancun Street, Building 1 Tsinghua University Science Park Innovation Tower, Room B1202C Haidian District, Beijing 100084 China

Phone: + 86 10 8215 0178 Fax: + 86 10 6270 3536 Contact By Email

Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

Regions

Countries

James M. Acton

Chen Qi

Evan A. Feigenbaum

Matt Ferchen

François Godement

Paul Haenle

Yukon Huang

Li Bin

Jessica Tuchman Mathews

C. Raja Mohan

Vikram Nehru

Douglas H. Paal

Michael Pettis

Lora Saalman

James L. Schoff

Shi Zhiqin

Sun Xuefeng

Michael Swaine

Dmitri Trenin

Kevin Tu

Wang Tao

Yan Xuetong

Zhang Chuanjie

Zhang Lihua

Zhao Kejin